Business & Economics

The turmoil that rocked Asian markets after the middle of 1997 and that spread far afield was the third major currency crisis of the 1990s. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea suffered outright recessions in 1998. In an effort to contain the crisis, almost $120 billion was pledged in IMF-led official rescue packages. How could this happen to a group of countries that has been so highly regarded in the 1990's by private international capital markets? How could the crisis be overcome, and what changes are necessary to prevent it from happening again?

Morris Goldstein provides the answers to these questions by first explaining how the Asian financial crisis arose and spread. He traces the crisis through its three interrelated origins: financial sector weaknesses; external sector problems; and the contagion that spread from Thailand to other countries. Goldstein then outlines what needed to be done in the ASEAN-4 economies, in Japan and China, and in the design of IMF-led official rescue packages to end the crisis. Goldstein's final remarks offer specific proposals for improving the international financial architecture.

Protesters now routinely fill the streets when any large, formal meeting dealing with international economic issues takes place. They express concern about the potential social and environmental costs of globalization and want negotiators to address these issues in trade agreements and international organizations. In addition, the debate over whether and how to link labor standards to trade has led to an impasse in American trade policy for much of the past decade and has tied the hands of US trade negotiators. Proposals to "let the market do it" or "let the International Labor Organization (ILO) do it" abound, but it is less common to find any serious analysis of just how activists can galvanize consumers to demand that corporations raise labor standards in their global operations or how the ILO can become more effective.

In this study, Elliott and Freeman move beyond the debate on the relative merits and risks of a social clause in trade agreements and focus on practical approaches for improving labor standards in a more integrated global economy. The authors examine both what is being done in these areas and what more needs to be done to ensure that steady and tangible progress toward universal respect for core labor standards is made. While concluding that the ILO should have primary responsibility for labor standards, the book also suggests that the WTO should consider how to address egregious and willful violations of core labor standards if they are trade related.

In September 1985, emissaries of the world's five leading industrial nations—the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Japan—secretly gathered at the Plaza Hotel in New York City and unveiled an unprecedented effort to correct the largest set of current account and exchange rate imbalances that had ever threatened the world economy. The Plaza Accord is credited with sharply realigning exchange rates, significantly reducing current account imbalances, and countering protectionist pressures in the United States. But did the Accord provide a foundation for ongoing international financial stability and policy coordination? Or was it simply a unique one-time coincidence of national interests?

The Plaza experience continues to inform today's debates about the limits and possibilities of international monetary cooperation. In late 2015, leading policymakers and economists—including those who were involved in the Accord's design, negotiation, and implementation—held a Plaza Retrospective conference at the Baker Institute for Public Policy to evaluate the Accord's legacy and how its collaborative spirit can be applied today. This volume presents their views and analyses to provide guidance for a time when the world again faces the prospect of currency disequilibria, growing imbalances, trade policy reactions, and thus uncertainty for both the global economy and world politics.

Data disclosure: The data underlying the analysis in this volume are available. The data used in chapter 14 are taken directly from William Cline's Policy Briefs 15-8 and 15-20, with the exception that they have been manipulated with a key assumption stated in the chapter.

Like the robber barons of the 19th century Gilded Age, a new and proliferating crop of billionaires is driving rapid development and industrialization in poor countries. The accelerated industrial growth spurs economic prosperity for some, but it also widens the gap between the super rich and the rest of the population, especially the very poor.

In Rich People Poor Countries, Caroline Freund identifies and analyzes nearly 700 emerging-market billionaires whose net worth adds up to more than $2 trillion. Freund finds that these titans of industry are propelling poor countries out of their small-scale production and agricultural past and into a future of multinational industry and service-based mega firms. And more often than not, the new billionaires are using their newfound acumen to navigate the globalized economy, without necessarily relying on political connections, inheritance, or privileged access to resources. This story of emerging-market billionaires and the global businesses they create dramatically illuminates the process of industrialization in the modern world economy.

First came the financial and debt crisis in Greece, then government financing difficulties and rescue programs in Ireland in 2010 and Portugal in 2011. Before long, Italy and Spain were engulfed by financial contagion as well. Finally in 2012, the European Central Bank pledged to do "whatever it takes" to preserve the euro area with purchases of government bonds, a step that achieved impressive results, according to William R. Cline in this important new book.

One of the world's leading experts on fiscal and debt issues, Cline mobilizes meticulously researched and forceful arguments to trace the history of the euro area debt crisis and makes projections of future debt sustainability. He argues that euro area leaders made the right decision to keep the euro from breaking apart but warns against complacency about the future. Cline contends that troubled European economies should continue their fiscal consolidation but that further debt restructurings for most countries are not called for. Greece is a special case and may need some further debt relief contingent on continued progress on fiscal and structural reform, however. In this landmark study, Cline offers a detailed analysis of the mistakes, successes, and options for Europe as it struggles to overcome its worst economic disaster since World War II.

Countries blessed with abundant natural resources often seek financial and political power from their supposedly lucky status. But the potentially negative impact of natural resources on development of poor countries is captured in the phrase "the resource curse." Instead of success and prosperity, producers of gold, oil, rubber, sugar, and other commodities—many in the least developed parts of Africa and Asia—often remain mired in poverty and plagued by economic mismanagement, political authoritarianism, foreign exploitation, and violent conflict.

These difficulties and the many challenges they pose for American foreign policy are the focus of this important new book. Marcus Noland and Cullen S. Hendrix review recent developments as poor countries struggle to avoid the "resource curse" but fall too often into that trap. They call for support for international efforts to encourage greater transparency and improved management of natural resource wealth and for new partnerships between the West and the developing world to "confront the curse."

In mid-2009 Simeon Djankov, who had dealt with a variety of economic and financial crises as chief economist for finance and private sector development at the World Bank, was suddenly thrust into the job of finance minister of his native Bulgaria. For nearly four years in that post, he attended more than 40 meetings of European finance ministers and had a front row seat at the intense discussions and struggles to overcome the economic and financial crisis that threatened to unravel the historic undertaking of an economically integrated Europe.

In this personal account, Djankov details his odyssey on the front lines, observing Europe's fitful efforts to contain crises in Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, and France. He tells the inside story of how the European Central Bank assumed responsibility for the crisis, pledging to do "whatever it takes" to save the euro area. This candid book recounts the disagreements over fiscal austerity, monetary policy, and banking supervision, while focusing on the personalities who promoted progress—and those who opposed it. He also tells the dramatic story of the events that led to his own resignation as finance minister in 2013 over the policies he was pursuing to spare Bulgaria from getting sucked into the crisis.

New drilling techniques for oil and natural gas are propelling an energy production renaissance in the United States. As the US economy struggles to emerge from the Great Recession, many see the boom as a possible source of economic salvation that could reduce unemployment and revitalize American manufacturing. Until now, however, there has been little objective analysis of the energy boom's economic consequences.

In this major study, Trevor Houser and Shashank Mohan fill that gap. They assess the impact of the recent and projected increase in domestic energy production on US GDP, employment growth, manufacturing competitiveness, household expenditures, and international trade balance. Alongside its economic impact, the American energy revolution is raising new environmental and trade policy questions. What are the consequences for the environment and global warming of increased domestic oil and gas production? Should companies be allowed to export the energy they produce or will doing so undermine American manufacturing competitiveness? Houser and Mohan provide independent research and analysis that will help policymakers navigate these issues.

Americans have long been ambivalent toward foreign direct investment in the United States. Foreign multinational corporations may be a source of capital, technology, and jobs. But what are the implications for US workers, firms, communities, and consumers as the United States remains the most popular destination for foreign multinational investment?

Theodore H. Moran and Lindsay Oldenski find that foreign multinational firms that invest in the United States are, alongside US-headquartered American multinationals, the most productive and highest-paying segment of the US economy. These firms conduct more research and development, provide more value added to US domestic inputs, and export more goods and services than other firms in the US economy. The superior technology and management techniques they employ spill over horizontally and vertically to improve the performance of local firms and workers. As the United States wants not only to expand employment but also create well-paying jobs that reverse the falling earnings that many US workers and middle class families have suffered in recent decades, it is more important than ever to enhance the United States as a destination for multinational investors.

What began as a relatively localized crisis in Greece in early 2010 soon escalated to envelop Ireland and Portugal. By the second half of 2011, the contagion had spread to the far larger economies of Italy and Spain. In mid-September the Peterson Institute and Bruegel hosted a conference designed to contribute to the formulation of policies that could help resolve the euro area debt crisis. This volume presents the conference papers; several are updated through end-2011.

European experts examine the political context in Greece (Loukas Tsoukalis), Ireland (Alan Ahearne), Portugal (Pedro Lourtie), Spain (Guillermo de la Dehesa), Italy (Riccardo Perissich), Germany (Daniela Schwarzer), and France (Zaki Laïdi). Lessons from past debt restructurings are then examined by Jeromin Zettelmeyer (economic) and Lee Buchheit (legal). The two editors separately consider the main current policy issues: debt sustainability by country, private sector involvement and contagion, alternative restructuring approaches, how to assemble a large emergency financing capacity, whether the European Central Bank (ECB) should be a lender of last resort, whether joint-liability "eurobonds" would be feasible and desirable, and the implications of a possible break-up of the euro area. The luncheon address by George Soros and a description (by Steven R. Weisman with Silvia B. Merler) of the policy simulation game played on the second day of the conference complete the volume. Involving market participants and experts representing the roles of euro area governments, the ECB, IMF, G-7, and credit rating agencies, the game led to a proposal for leveraging the capacity of the European Financial Stability Facility through arrangements with the ECB.

The global financial crisis and ensuing economic downturn has raised many questions concerning the future of global economic growth. Prior to the financial crisis, global growth was characterized by growing imbalances, reflected primarily in large trade surpluses in China, Japan, Germany, and the oil exporting countries and rapidly growing deficits, primarily in the United States. The global crisis raises the question of whether the previous growth model of low consumption, high saving countries such as China is obsolete. Although a strong and rapid policy response beginning in the early fall of 2008 made China the first globally significant economy to come off the bottom and begin to grow more rapidly, critics charged that China's recovery was based on the old growth model, relying primarily on burgeoning investment in the short run and the expectation of a revival of expanding net exports once global recovery gained traction. Critics, however, argued that as government-financed investment inevitably tapered off, the likelihood was that global recovery would not be sufficiently strong for China's exports to resume their former role as a major contributor to China's economic expansion. The prospect, in the eyes of these critics, is that China's growth will inevitably falter.

This study examines China's response to the global crisis, the prospects for altering the model of economic growth that dominated the first decade of this century, and the implications for the United States and the global economy of successful Chinese rebalancing. On the first it analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of China's stimulus program. On the second it analyzes the nature of origins of the imbalances in China's economy and the array of policy options that the government has to transition to more consumption-driven growth. On the third successful rebalancing would mean that more rapid growth of consumption would offset the drag on growth from a shrinkage of China's external surplus. Successful rebalancing would mean China would no longer be a source of financing for any ongoing US external deficit. From a global perspective China would no longer be a source of the global economic imbalances that contributed to the recent global financial crisis and great recession.

Experts have long questioned the effect of currency undervaluation on overall GDP growth. They have viewed the underlying basis for this policy—intervention in currency markets to keep the price of the home currency cheap—as doomed to failure on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Moreover, the view has been that overvalued currencies hurt economic growth but undervalued currencies cannot help in growth acceleration. A parallel belief has been that the real exchange rate—that is, a country's competitive ranking—cannot be affected by merely changing the nominal exchange rate. This view is grounded in the belief, and expectation, that inflation follows any devaluation of currency. Hence, the conclusion that the real exchange rate cannot be affected by policy. However, given China's remarkable performance in recent decades, this traditional view is being reexamined. China devalued its currency by large amounts in the 1980s and early 1990s; instead of inflation, it achieved high growth. Today, there is near-universal demand for China to significantly revalue its currency.

This book examines the veracity of various propositions relating to currency misalignments, and their effect on various items of policy interest. The author subjects more than a century of global exchange rate management and growth outcomes to rigorous empirical analysis and demonstrates convincingly that a country can systematically devalue and yet prosper. The analysis helps in interpreting several phenomena, especially for the last three decades, which have witnessed high economic growth in developing countries, a widening of global imbalances, and a sharp increase in reserve accumulation, particularly among high-growth Asian economies. The book shows that these events are strongly linked via a consistent policy of currency undervaluation in Asian economies.

In his new book, Arvind Subramanian presents the following possibilities: What if, contrary to common belief, China's economic dominance is a present-day reality rather than a faraway possibility? What if the renminbi's takeover of the dollar as the world's reserve currency is not decades, but mere years, away? And what if the United States's economic preeminence is not, as many economists and policymakers would like to believe, in its own hands, but China's to determine?

Subramanian's analysis is based on a new index of economic dominance grounded in a historical perspective. His examination makes use of real-world examples, comparing China's rise with the past hegemonies of Great Britain and the United States. His attempt to quantify and project economic and currency dominance leads him to the conclusion that China's dominance is not only more imminent, but also broader in scope, and much larger in magnitude, than is currently imagined. He explores the profound effect this might have on the United States, as well as on the global financial and trade system. Subramanian concludes with a series of policy proposals for other nations to reconcile China's rise with continued openness in the global economic order, and to insure against China becoming a malign hegemon.

Volatile exchange rates and how to manage them are a contentious topic whenever economic policymakers gather in international meetings. This book examines the broad parameters of exchange rate policy in light of both high-powered theory and real-world experience. What are the costs and benefits of flexible versus fixed exchange rates? How much of a role should the exchange rate play in monetary policy? Why don't volatile exchange rates destabilize inflation and output?

The principal finding of this book is that using monetary policy to fight exchange rate volatility, including through the adoption of a fixed exchange rate regime, leads to greater volatility of employment, output, and inflation. In other words, the "cure" for exchange rate volatility is worse than the disease. This finding is demonstrated in economic models, in historical case studies, and in statistical analysis of the data. The book devotes considerable attention to understanding the reasons why volatile exchange rates do not destabilize inflation and output. The book concludes that many countries would benefit from allowing greater flexibility of their exchange rates in order to target monetary policy at stabilization of their domestic economies. Few, if any, countries would benefit from a move in the opposite direction.

This study provides alternative estimates of the costs of greenhouse gas abatement through 2050 that would be necessary to limit CO2 atmospheric concentrations to approximately 450 parts per million and limiting warming to 2°C. Specific estimates are provided for 25 major economies (with the European Union as a single economy). Business as usual baselines are first developed, based on US Department of Energy projections through 2030 and on maintenance of country-specific trends in GDP growth, energy efficiency growth, and carbon-efficiency of energy growth thereafter. The central policy simulation then involves a "Copenhagen Convergence" path, in which major economies meet their Copenhagen (December 2009) pledges for 2020, and thereafter emissions per capita decline along a path that by 2050 results in equal per capita emissions in all countries.

Three abatement cost functions are used for calculating the resulting abatement costs: a model based on McKinsey & Co. estimates for 2030; the Nordhaus RICE model cost functions; and a set of summary cost regressions calculated from the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (EMF-22) survey of abatement models. It is found that abatement costs should be moderate, reaching about one-fourth to two-thirds of one percent of GDP by 2030 and 1 to 2 percent of GDP by 2050. Costs can be reduced by international trading, but by less than generally perceived. A more ambitious early start on abatement than pledged at Copenhagen could reduce full-period costs. The study calculates corresponding magnitudes of investment for abatement as well as adaptation costs for developing countries, and identifies a benchmark of about $80 billion annually (excluding China) by 2020, lending support to the $100 billion target pledged for industrial country financial support by that year.

This book presents evidence that public debts in the advanced economies have surged in recent years to levels not recorded since the end of World War II, surpassing the heights reached during the First World War and the Great Depression. At the same time, private debt levels, particularly those of financial institutions and households, are in uncharted territory and are (in varying degrees) a contingent liability of the public sector in many countries. Historically, high leverage episodes have been associated with slower economic growth and a higher incidence of default or, more generally, restructuring of public and private debts.

A more subtle form of debt restructuring in the guise of "financial repression" (which had its heyday during the tightly regulated Bretton Woods system) also importantly facilitated sharper and more rapid debt reduction than would have otherwise been the case from the late 1940s to the 1970s. It is conjectured here that the pressing needs of governments to reduce debt rollover risks and curb rising interest expenditures in light of the substantial debt overhang (combined with the widespread "official aversion" to explicit restructuring) are leading to a revival of financial repression—including more directed lending to government by captive domestic audiences (such as pension funds), explicit or implicit caps on interest rates, and tighter regulation on cross-border capital movements.

This study addresses a fundamentally new feature of the contemporary world economy: the simultaneous buildup of very large public deficits and debt positions in virtually all of the advanced high-income countries. The recent global financial crisis sharply accelerated this fiscal deterioration, but it was already well underway in some countries, including the United States, where demographic prospects had posed extremely worrisome trajectories for a number of years.

The book has three basic objectives. First, it projects the global fiscal outlook to 2035. Second, it asks whether the combination of deficits and debt in a large number of countries at the same time produces an impact on the world economy that is qualitatively different from the more traditional emergence of such problems in one or a few countries in any given period. Third, it analyzes the effects of the fiscal prospects on key economic variables including global interest rates and growth rates.

The analysis finds that the current public debt profiles in most advanced economies will grow to dangerous and unsustainable levels over the next couple of decades unless major changes are made in projected spending and revenue levels. The authors conclude that the United States and Japan, in particular, need to start planning now for significant future budget cuts to minimize the risk of a crisis. Acting soon enables the adjustment to be phased in over an extended period, which cushions the inevitable adjustment costs, while avoiding the potentially enormous pressures that could be levied by markets if correction is delayed too long.

This volume is the culmination of Institute investigations on the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and development. Today, more than one-third of world trade takes place in the form of intrafirm transactions—that is, trade among the various parts of the same corporate network spread across borders—and the bulk of technology is transferred within the confines of integrated international production systems. This means that FDI and the operations of multinational corporations have become central to the world economy at large. Nowhere is this more important than for developing countries.

But as Theodore Moran argues in this new volume, FDI is not a single phenomenon. FDI has such different impacts in the extractive sector, infrastructure, manufacturing and assembly, and services—and presents such distinctive policy challenges—that each broad category of FDI must be treated on its own terms. Indeed, past studies that have aggregated all FDI flows together to try to find some unique relationship to host-country growth or welfare have led to unreliable substantive findings and, sometimes, mistaken policy conclusions. Moran examines each of the principal forms of FDI, extracts the best from previous analysis, and offers new findings and perspectives about how benefits from FDI in each sector can be enhanced and potential damages limited or eliminated.

In 1963, John F. Kennedy said that "a rising tide lifts all the boats. And a partnership, by definition, serves both parties, without domination or unfair advantage." US international economic policy since World War II has been based on the premise that foreign economic growth is in America's economic, as well as political and security, self-interest. The bursting of the speculative dot.com bubble, slowing US growth, and the global financial crisis and its aftermath, however, have led to radical changes in Americans' perceptions of the benefits of global trade. Many Americans believe that trade with emerging-market economies is the most important reason for US job loss, especially in manufacturing, and is detrimental to American welfare and an important source of wage inequality. Several prominent economists have reinforced these public concerns.

In this study, Lawrence Edwards and Robert Z. Lawrence confront these fears through an extensive survey of the empirical literature and in depth analyses of the evidence. Their conclusions contradict several popular theories about the negative impact of US trade with developing countries. They find considerable evidence that while adjusting to foreign economic growth does present America with challenges, growth in emerging-market economies is in America's economic interest. It is hard, of course, for Americans to become used to a world in which the preponderance of economic activity is located in Asia. But one of America's great strengths is its adaptability. And if it does adapt, the American economy can be buoyed by that rising tide.

This study examines the role of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in the global economy and financial system. Sovereign wealth funds are not a new phenomenon in international finance. Governments of a few countries have used similar entities to manage their international financial assets for several decades. Moreover, countries have always held international reserves, and government-owned entities have made cross-border investments for many years.

Sovereign wealth funds or their equivalent pose profound issues for the countries that own them with respect to macroeconomic policy and the potential for corruption. They also raise issues for countries that receive SWF investments as well as for the international financial system as a whole because government ownership introduces potential political and economic power issues into the management of these cross-border assets. This study traces the origins of SWFs. It describes the issues raised by these large governmental holdings of cross-border assets for the countries that own them, for the host countries, and for the international financial system. The study lays out what is known about the 50-plus SWFs of various countries. Some countries have more than one such entity, and a sample of government-managed pension funds is included in this analysis because they raise most of the same basic policy issues.

Using publicly available information that is provided on a systematic basis, the author has previously developed a "scoreboard" for these funds involving a number of elements grouped in four categories: structure, governance, transparency and accountability, and behavioral rules. The 2008 edition contributed to the development of a set of generally accepted principles and practices, the Santiago Principles, for SWFs by the International Working Group operating under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund. This publication presents an updated scoreboard for an expanded list of funds, evaluates the Santiago Principles, and examines current compliance with those principles. The study also examines the policies of recipient countries and the role of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) investment codes. Finally, the study discusses the evolving role of SWFs in the context of the global economic and financial crisis and its aftermath and will make recommendations for the policies of countries both managing such funds and those that expect to receive investments from them in the future.

The rapid emergence of China as a major industrial power poses a complex challenge for global resource markets. Backed by the Chinese government, Chinese companies have been acquiring equity stakes in natural resource companies, extending loans to mining and petroleum investors, and writing long-term procurement contracts for oil and minerals. These activities have aroused concern that China might be "locking up" natural resource supplies, gaining "preferential access" to available output, and extending "control" over the world's extractive industries. On the demand side, Chinese appetite for vast amounts of energy and minerals puts tremendous strain on the international supply system. On the supply side, Chinese efforts to procure raw materials can either exacerbate or help solve the problems of high demand.

Evidence from the 16 largest Chinese natural resource procurement arrangements shows that Chinese efforts—like Japanese deployments of capital and purchase agreements in the late 1970s through the 1980s—fall predominantly into categories that help expand, diversify, and make more competitive the global supplier system. Investigation of smaller projects indicates the 16 largest do not suffer from selection bias. However, Chinese attempts to exercise control over mining of rare earth elements may constitute a significant exception. The investigative focus of this analysis is deliberately narrow and precise, assessing the impact of Chinese resource procurement on the structure of the global supply base. The broader policy discussion in the concluding chapter raises other separate important issues, including the impact of Chinese resource procurement on rogue states, on authoritarian leadership, on civil wars, on corrupt payments and the deterioration of governance standards, and on environmental damage. Such effects may make patterns of Chinese resource procurement objectionable, on grounds quite apart from the debate about possible "control" of access on the part of China and Chinese companies.

Intellectual property rights (IPRs)—patents, copyrights, and trademarks—have moved from an arcane area of legal analysis and a policy backwater to the forefront of global economic policymaking. Apple and Samsung's patent battle illustrates the importance of IPRs and how they impact everyone. Private Rights and Public Problems is a completed update of the seminal, oft-cited 2000 study, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy. This new book documents the remarkable global changes in IPRs policies that have taken place since the founding of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and analyzes both the benefits and costs of the global IPRs system.

Does stronger IPRs protection increase incentives for innovation and raise returns to international technology transfer or does it raise the cost of acquiring new technology and products? Have the changes benefited technology producers or technology consumers? Do these policies help or hinder the transfer of key technologies used to address critical global public needs, such as essential medicines, green technologies, bio-engineered seed varieties, products made from genetic resources, and scientific and educational materials? The book examines these issues through an analysis of the economic effects of extended international protection and partial harmonization of IPRs. Ultimately, it argues that the global IPRs system stands at a fundamental crossroad, facing more challenges than ever before. It makes several suggestions for improving the efficiency and fairness of the newly globalized system in the near future, if the political will can be found.

This book examines the role of financial globalization in economic growth and derives corresponding implications for economic policy. Although economists have debated the importance of openness to international trade, they generally agree that in the market for goods, international openness is more favorable to growth than a largely closed economy. In contrast, whether external financial openness boosts or curbs growth has long been a controversial issue, and it has become even more so with the outbreak of the global financial crisis of 2007–09.

The East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s raised doubts on this issue, and helped spur a wave of empirical research on it. Supporters of financial globalization—such as Stanley Fischer and Lawrence Summers—maintained that, with the right policies, open capital markets continued to be a powerful means for enhancing growth. Critics, including Jagdish Bhagwati and Joseph Stiglitz, argued that the crisis demonstrated that, unlike free trade in goods, free mobility for capital is counterproductive for growth. In the past decade a large empirical literature has emerged examining this question. Overall it has tended to find that financial globalization has "positive marginal effects on growth." The US-led financial crisis of 2007–09 swept most of the developed and emerging-market economies into its vortex. The global crisis has set the stage for an intensification of the debate on financial openness. Some analysts and policymakers will be inclined to escalate calls for restrictions on capital flows. In the acute phase of the crisis that began in September 2008, major stock markets around the world plunged along with the US equity market, and many currencies fell sharply against the dollar (excluding the yen, which proved, like the dollar, to be a safe-haven currency). If countries had maintained closed capital markets, some may argue, they would not have been vulnerable to these shocks. Cline asserts that financial globalization represents a significant factor in economic growth of emerging-market economies. Further, he argues that a significant portion of current-day GDP can be attributed to the cumulative influence of financial openness, especially in industrial countries.

This study surveys the extensive literature on this issue to arrive at a broad sense of the state of the evidence for and against the growth benefits of financial openness. The survey is critical in the sense that it seeks to evaluate strengths and weaknesses of the various studies in addition to summarizing their results. It then applies leading quantitative models from the literature to arrive at synthesis estimates of the contribution of financial openness to growth for major industrial and emerging-market economies over the past four decades. Finally, the book considers the preliminary evidence on whether the 2007–09 financial crisis constitutes grounds for a major change in the policy verdict on financial openness. As part of that reconsideration, the analysis reviews the causes of the global crisis, as well as its principal events and policy interventions.

Over the first ten years of its existence, the euro has proved to be more than a powerful symbol of collective identity. It has provided price stability to previously inflation-prone countries; it has offered a shelter against currency crises; and it has by and large been conducive to budgetary discipline. The eurozone has attracted five new members in addition to the initial eleven, and many countries in Europe wish to adopt it.

The euro has also been successful internationally. Even though research presented in this volume confirms that it has not rivaled the dollar's world currency status, it has certainly become a strong regional currency in Europe and the Mediterranean region. Some countries in the region have de facto adopted it, several peg to it, and many have become at least partially euroized. However, the euro's impressive first decade is likely to be followed by a much more difficult period. The present financial crisis is posing at least two important challenges: real economic adjustment within the euro area and maintenance of fiscal and financial stability without a central government authority capable of taking appropriate financial and fiscal decisions in difficult times.

The papers and remarks in this volume demonstrate that the euro has proved to be attractive as a fair weather currency for countries and investors well beyond its borders. But it remains to be seen whether it is equipped to also succeed as a stormy weather currency.

In 2006, a team led by the English economist Sir Nicholas Stern issued a striking report that analyzed the economic dimensions of global climate change and called for immediate collective action to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This seminal report poses the critical question of how much emissions should be reduced within specific timeframes. To answer the challenge of finding a best-practices approach, Global Warming and the World Trading System looks at the economic aspects of GHG emissions and seeks a policy method to reduce them without adversely affecting global trade.

The book begins with a survey of relevant data—such as emissions reports per sector—and evaluates current US climate policy options, focusing on the intricacies of specific Congressional bills. In this vein, this study examines whether the competitiveness provisions now under consideration are compatible with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and explores the pragmatic opportunities the WTO should capitalize on in order to accomplish two goals simultaneously: ensure "policy space" for countries to limit national GHG emissions without sacrificing the competitive position of their own industries and preserve an open trading system relatively free of discrimination and opportunistic protectionist measures. Should governments use trade measures to encourage other countries to cooperate in the adoption of environmental policies? The authors anticipate the potential negative environmental and economic outcomes as well as the disputes over violation of GATT articles. This book addresses how to avoid serious setbacks in an effort to reduce emissions without compromising the status of both domestic and international carbon-intensive industries. Most importantly, the book considers what can be done by environmental organizations to head off conflict with the WTO.

Under what conditions might a foreign acquisition of a US company constitute a genuine national security threat to the United States? What kinds of risks and threats should analysts and strategists on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), as well as their congressional overseers, be prepared to identify and deal with? This study looks at three types of foreign acquisitions of US companies that may pose a legitimate national security threat.

The first is a proposed acquisition that would make the United States dependent on a foreign-controlled supplier of goods or services that are crucial to the functioning of the US economy and that this supplier might delay, deny, or place conditions on the provision of those goods or services. The second is a proposed acquisition that would allow the transfer to a foreign-controlled entity of technology or other expertise that might be deployed in a manner harmful to US national interests. The third potential threat is a proposed acquisition that would provide the capability to infiltrate, conduct surveillance on, or sabotage the provision of goods or services that are crucial to the functioning of the US economy. This study analyzes these threats in detail and considers what criteria are needed for a proposed foreign acquisition to be considered threatening. Ultimately, the vast majority of foreign acquisitions pose no credible threat to national security on these grounds.

The turmoil in financial markets that resulted from the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis in the United States indicates the need to dramatically transform regulation and supervision of financial institutions. Would these institutions have been sounder if the 2004 Revised Framework on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II accord)—negotiated between 1999 and 2004—had already been fully implemented? Basel II represents a dramatic change in capital regulation of large banks in the countries represented on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Its internal ratings–based approaches to capital regulation will allow large banks to use their own credit risk models to set minimum capital requirements. The Basel Committee itself implicitly acknowledged in spring 2008 that the revised framework would not have been adequate to contain the risks exposed by the subprime crisis and needed strengthening.

This crisis has highlighted two more basic questions about Basel II: One, is the method of capital regulation incorporated in the revised framework fundamentally misguided? Two, even if the basic Basel II approach has promise as a paradigm for domestic regulation, is the effort at extensive international harmonization of capital rules and supervisory practice useful and appropriate? This book provides the answers. It evaluates Basel II as a bank regulatory paradigm and as an international arrangement, considers some possible alternatives, and recommends significant changes in the arrangement.

Over the past five years China has emerged as the world's largest global surplus economy; indeed by 2007–08 the size of its surplus relative to its GDP was of a magnitude unprecedented for a large trading economy. This development is especially surprising since in the first twenty-five years of economic reform China's trade and current account surpluses were quite small by East Asian standards, averaging less than 2 percent of GDP.

This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the key economic challenges facing the Chinese authorities in light of the still undervalued exchange rate, the large build-up of foreign exchange reserves, and more recently the sharp decline in economic growth. It analyzes the implications of China's exchange-rate policy for the effectiveness of monetary policy, the transition to a commercially oriented banking system, the evolving structure of output and demand, and the risk of protectionism abroad. The policy-options portion of the study takes account of the significant real effective appreciation of the renminbi over the past fifteen months and will contrast the pros and cons of a "stay-the-course" policy with that of a bolder, "three-stage" approach that would seek to maintain recent progress and to reduce even further the undervaluation of the renminbi.

More than two and a half years have passed since China announced a number of changes to its foreign exchange regime in July 2005. During this period, the debate on the pros and cons of China's exchange rate policy, which had begun in earnest several years earlier, intensified. This important new book, based on an Institute conference in October 2007, takes stock of exchange rate policy in China and identifies the major policy options going forward.

Specific proposals presented in the volume address how best to eliminate any misalignment of the renminbi; how best to reduce pressures emanating from the sterilization of large reserve accumulation; how best to make capital flows the ally—not the enemy—of exchange rate policy; and what institutional arrangements and policy guidelines to put in place to reap the greatest benefits from management of China's large foreign exchange reserves. Leading experts—including three from China—have contributed to the volume. The keynote address by Wu Xiaoling, deputy governor to the People's Bank of China at the time of the conference, is also presented in the book.

International investors poured vast sums of money into East Asian and Latin American countries during the mid-1990s, when the emerging market boom was at its peak. Then Thailand stumbled and panic seized the markets, and boom gave way to bust. Investors suffered large financial losses, while Asian countries suddenly experienced large capital outflows and the macroeconomic pressures these wrought plunged countries that had been growing rapidly ("miraculously") into crisis. Much the same had happened in Latin America when the debt crisis broke in 1982.

This book investigates what can be done to make the international capital market a constructive force in promoting development in emerging markets. John Williamson concludes that the problem of cyclicality that has undermined the value of international borrowing cannot be tackled just, or even mainly, from the supply side, but will require actions on the part of both creditors and debtors.

The mainstay of federal business taxation, the US corporate income tax, is riddled with distortions and inequities. As a means of taxing the richest Americans—a popular goal—the corporate income tax is a hopeless failure. Many companies pay no corporate tax, and among those that do, the burden is highly uneven. Meanwhile, the richest Americans command income from numerous sources besides corporate dividends. The distortions and inequities are amazing. Under pressure from business lobbies, Congress legislates deductions and exemptions that twist the corporate tax base far from any plausible financial definition; then Congress enacts "targeted" tax credits to carry out ersatz industrial policies. Faced with a tax terrain of mountains and ravines, corporations employ armies of lawyers and accountants to devise avoidance strategies.

This book proposes to replace the corporate income tax with a tax that has a much broader base at a much lower rate. Two alternatives are explored: the National Retail Sales Tax (NRST) and the Corporate Activity Tax (CAT). To address the issue of regressivity, both alternatives are coupled with measures to preserve the real spending power of households at the lowest income levels.

Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed.

This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt.

Between 1977 and 1997, there was a precipitous decline in the proportion of US workers with median education (12 years or less) who were represented by a labor union—from 29 to 14 percent; the unionization proportion declined much less among workers with above-median education (19 to 13 percent). The union wage premium also declined for workers with basic education, from 58 to 51 percent, whereas it rose slightly for better-educated unionists, from 18 to 19 percent. Thus, whatever safety net American unions provide was disproportionately lost by the less-educated workers who, arguably, need it the most.

In this study, Robert E. Baldwin investigates the role of changes in US imports and exports in explaining this dramatic decline. The main analysis (which includes workers in manufacturing as well as service sectors) relates changes in the number of union workers across industries to changes in domestic spending, imports, exports, and the intensity with which labor is used across these industries for both union and nonunion workers. Baldwin finds that although globalization (i.e., increased trade) seems to have contributed only modestly to the general decline in unionization, it has, more importantly, contributed to the decline in unionization among workers with less education. The study concludes with a discussion on the implication of this and the other findings for governmental policy and for the policy position of unions toward globalization.

After nearly five decades of insulation from world markets, state controls, and slow growth, India embarked in 1991 on a process of liberalization of controls and progressive integration with the global economy in an effort to put its economy on a path of rapid and sustained growth. Despite major changes in the government since then, the thrust on reforms has been maintained. According to the World Bank, only 10 out of 145 countries had more rapid growth than India at over 6 percent per year in the 1990s and two had the same as India's.

In this study, T. N. Srinivasan and Suresh D. Tendulkar analyze the economics and politics of India's recent and growing integration with the world economy. They argue that this process has to be nurtured and accelerated if India is to eradicate its poverty and take its rightful place in the global economic system.The study covers the historical roots and the political economy of India's late integration; domestic and external constraints on integration; external capital inflows including foreign direct investment; and India's emerging comparative advantage in the information technology industry and services, particularly computer software. The final chapter offers policy recommendations including proposals that India could make at the ongoing Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.

In March 2002, President George W. Bush proposed establishing the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a new foreign aid program designed to provide substantial assistance to a select group of low-income countries that are committed to sound development policies. The MCA could bring about the most fundamental changes to US foreign assistance policy in 40 years.

In this study, Steven Radelet examines the MCA's potential promise and possible pitfalls. He offers a rigorous analysis of the MCA's central challenge: making foreign aid more effective in supporting economic growth and poverty reduction in the poor countries. He systematically explores what makes the MCA different and pinpoints the critical issues that will determine its success or failure.The book concludes with important recommendations about how the MCA should be strengthened to solidify its innovation and independence and to ensure coordination with other US foreign aid programs. Written at a practical level, this book is an invaluable resource for anyone seriously interested in the MCA and US foreign assistance policy.

This volume is a successor of sorts to the Institute's 1986 volume Toward Renewed Economic Growth in Latin America, which blazed the trail for the market-oriented economic reforms that were adopted in Latin America in the subsequent years. It again presents the work of a group of leading Latin American economists who were asked to think about the nature of the economic policy agenda that the region should be pursuing after a decade that was punctuated by crises, achieved disappointingly slow growth, and saw no improvement in the region's highly skewed income distribution. The study diagnoses the first-generation (liberalizing and stabilizing) reforms that are still lacking, the complementary second-generation (institutional) reforms that are necessary to provide the institutional infrastructure of a market economy with an egalitarian bias, and the new initiatives that are needed to crisis-proof the economies of the region to end its perpetual series of crises.

Contributors: Daniel Artana, Nancy Birdsall, Roberto Bouzas, Saúl Keifman, Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, Ricardo López Murphy, Claudio de Moura Castro, Fernando Navajas, Patricio Navia, Liliana Rojas-Suarez, Jaime Saavedra, Miguel Székely, Andrés Velasco, John Williamson, and Laurence Wolff.

Shortly after the Mexican crisis of 1994-95, the major industrial countries undertook to strengthen the international financial architecture. They sought to reduce the risk of future crises by increasing the availability of information about economic conditions in emerging-market countries and strengthening the financial systems of those countries. They sought better ways to manage future crises, including ways to involve private-sector creditors in crisis management.

In this book, Peter B. Kenen reviews the reform effort and assesses the results. He shows how the effort was influenced by the Asian, Russian, and Brazilian crises. He compares the results of the effort with the more radical recommendations of outside experts and of the Meltzer Report, and examines the implications of the reform effort for the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Kenen finds that there have been useful innovations but calls for bolder efforts aimed at five objectives: (1) increasing the usefulness of IMF surveillance by focusing it sharply on the sustainability of national policies, exchange rates, and debt profiles; (2) narrowing the scope of IMF conditionality by ceasing to treat acute crises as opportunities to achieve fundamental reforms; (3) providing incentives to foster financial reform in emerging-market countries and, in the interim, encouraging them to limit short-term foreign borrowing by their banks and corporations; (4) using the IMF's resources more effectively by making less money available but disbursing it more rapidly; and (5) enlisting the private sector in crisis management by introducing roll-over clauses into short-term debt contracts and collective-action clauses into long-term debt contracts.

The European currency crises of 1992-93, the Mexican crisis of 1994-95, and especially the Asian/global crisis of 1997-98, have all contributed to a heightened interest in the early warning signals of financial crises. This pathbreaking study presents a comprehensive battery of empirical tests on the performance of alternative early warning indicators for emerging-market economies that should prove useful in the construction of a more effective global warning system.

Not only are the authors able to draw conclusions about which specific indicators have sent the most reliable early warning signals of currency and banking crises in emerging economies, they also test the out-of-sample performance of the model during the Asian crisis and find that it does a good job of identifying the most vulnerable economies. In addition, they show how the early warning system can be used to construct a "composite" crisis indicator to weigh the importance of alternative channels of cross-country "contagion" of crises, and to generate information about the recovery path from crises.

This timely study comes on the eve of impending changes at the International Monetary Fund as that institution reexamines how it reacts to financial crises. Moreover, the study provides "... a wealth of valuable elements for anyone investigating and forecasting adverse developments in emerging markets as well as industrial countries," according to Ewoud Schuitemaker, vice president of the economics department at ABN AMRO Bank.

Price divergence is readily apparent to anyone who shops. Travelers from Manchester to London, or from Chicago to Paris, are hit by sticker shock. Products ranging from London Fog raincoats to Viagra are available over the Internet at half their retail store prices. Common experience tells us that prices for identical products differ between countries, between cities, even between neighboring shops. On the other hand, common experience also tells us that open markets and greater competition will force a degree of price convergence, if not identical prices.

This monograph presents speculative calculations that illustrate potential benefits from price convergence between countries. The authors take a fresh look at global economic integration by examining existing price divergence, and possible price convergence, across a range of consumer goods and then calculate the potential benefits of price convergence on a country-by-country basis and for the world as a whole. This study examines the potential benefits from price convergence resulting from more competition and market integration, not perfect competition and market integration. The authors calculate these benefits assuming that the world economy can attain the same degree of competition and market integration—and hence price convergence—as exists within the United States.

In this study Howard Lewis III and J. David Richardson explore the gains that workers, companies, and communities achieve from choosing to engage with the global economy. Why Global Commitment Really Matters! follows two earlier Institute publications that explored the benefits of exporting. This study summarizes new research on American importing, international investment, and technology transfers that shows similar benefits.

All types of global commitment seem to generate greater productivity, higher pay, stronger growth, and better survival rates. These in turn rejuvenate entire industries and their workforces and communities as they allow better firms and jobs to supplant those with less desirable traits. Exports, imports, investment, and technology transfer form a family of global commitments that spawns a family of economic rewards. The study shows that exactly the same patterns are being discovered in similar new research abroad. Little of this new research has made its way into the mainstream of public debate over trade and economic policies.The authors supplement their research survey with profiles of real American exporters, importers, multinational companies, foreign affiliates, and technology partners. They also weigh criticisms and alternative interpretations of the research, and examine the problems of those left on the margins of the global economy.

It is often pointed out that "for every bad borrower, and for every failed project, there is also a culpable lender or investor." This observation is particularly apt for the debate now raging in the capital markets: should private bankers and investment managers bear a greater share of the costs when financial crises erupt in emerging economies? Critics who have analyzed the "plumbing" of the world's financial architecture have thus far devoted enormous attention to the demand side—structural weaknesses in emerging markets. They have excoriated the IMF for ineptitude and policy mistakes. But the authors of this study argue that financial leaders of the G-10 nations (industrial nations that were hardly affected by the crises of 1997-98) owe a responsibility—both to their own citizens and the emerging markets—to take a far more vigilant stance.

Dobson and Hufbauer criticize the supply side of world capital markets and ask how G-10 capital suppliers can reform their own financial systems to make the world safe for large-scale international capital flows. They draw a comprehensive picture of international finance through an extensive review of capital flows, the major financial players behind these flows, and the balance between costs and benefits of international capital movements. The authors analyze the implications of changing the rules of the game and recommend specific policy measures.

President Franklin Roosevelt created the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) in 1934 to promote US trade in the midst of the Great Depression. At the outset, the Ex-Im Bank was instructed to supplement, not compete with, private sources of export finance. Historically, the Ex-Im Bank filled gaps when the private sector was reluctant to finance exports to politically uncertain areas—such as Latin America in the 1940s, Europe in the 1950s, and emerging markets more recently. Critics now ask whether—in the current era of vast private capital markets—significant financing gaps still exist that require government action. Put bluntly, should the Ex-Im Bank still be playing a role in financing US exports to emerging markets? Since the 1970s, the Ex-Im Bank has faced a new challenge: helping US exporters meet the financial competition from foreign export credit agencies (ECAs)—such as COFACE in France and the Export-Import Bank of Japan. The Ex-Im Bank has tried to cope with foreign ECAs in two different ways. One way is to negotiate common rules for export financing, under OECD auspices. The other is to match credit terms offered by foreign ECAs. A central question for the Ex-Im Bank in the 21st century is whether this dual strategy still provides a viable answer to an array of new forms of competition spawned by foreign ECAs.

The Institute for International Economics sponsored a conference in May 2000, both to honor the Bank's 65th anniversary and to look ahead at challenges facing the Ex-Im Bank. This volume—edited by former director of the Bank, Rita Rodriguez, and Institute Senior Fellow Gary Clyde Hufbauer—presents the papers from the conference. The papers both describe the Bank's current environment and identify new problems and opportunities in a global economy characterized by highly sophisticated private finance and intense competition for export markets. This volume provides an analytical basis for evaluating the Ex-Im Bank's future and suggests options that should be considered by President George W. Bush and Congress.

Contributors: Robert Rubin * James Harmon * Lorenz Schomerus * J. David Richardson * Renato Sucupira * Mauricio Moreira * William Cline * Peter Evans * Kenneth Oye * Allan Mendelowitz * William Niskanen * Robert Nardelli * John Lipsky * Daniel Zelikow *Robert Hormats * Hans Reich * A. Ian Gillespie * Fumio Hoshi * William Daley * James Leach * Lawrence Summers

Electronic commerce is changing the way businesses and consumers create, sell, and buy products, and the way they communicate and learn. How can policymakers position their countries to take advantage of this new environment? How should policymaking adjust to a more global, more networked, and more information-rich marketplace where relationships and jurisdictions between the governments, businesses, and citizens increasingly overlap? How can governments effectively harness rapidly changing technologies and partner with both domestic and foreign private sectors to reap the greatest benefits for their constituents?

This primer answers these questions using both general analysis and specific examples. It addresses in particular the needs of policymakers in emerging markets who must formulate and refine policies that affect e-commerce in areas such as telecommunications, finance, taxation, privacy, and international trade and domestic distribution. Companies considering doing business in these economies also will find that the examples offer insights into the issues that policymakers face, the different policy approaches they choose, and the market opportunities that arise as more and more economies around the world embrace global electronic commerce.

Japan is only one of many industrialized economies to suffer a financial crisis in the past 15 years, but it has suffered the most from its crisis—as measured in lost output and investment opportunities, and in the direct costs of clean-up. Comparing the response of Japanese policy in the 1990s to that of US monetary and financial policy to the American Savings and Loan Crisis of the late 1980s sheds light on the reasons for this outcome.

This volume was created by bringing together several leading academics from the United States and Japan—plus former senior policymakers from both countries—to discuss the challenges to Japanese financial and monetary policy in the 1990s. The papers address in turn both the monetary and financial aspects of the crisis, and the discussants bring together broad themes across the two countries' experiences. As the papers in this Special Report demonstrate, while the Japanese government's policy response to its banking crisis in the 1990s was slow in comparison to that of the US government a decade earlier, the underlying dynamics were similar. A combination of mismanaged partial deregulation and regulatory forebearance gave rise to the crisis and allowed it to deepen, and only the closure of some banks and injection of new capital into others began the resolution. The Bank of Japan's monetary policy from the late 1980s onward, however, was increasingly out of step with US or other developed country norms. In particular, the Bank of Japan's limited response to deflation after being granted independence in 1998 stands out as a dangerous and unusual stance.

Over the past 15 years, intellectual property rights (IPRs)-patents, copyrights, and trademarks-have moved from an arcane area of legal analysis and a policy backwater to the forefront of global economic policymaking. In the 1990s dozens of countries unilaterally strengthened their laws and regulations in this area, and many others are poised to do likewise. At the multilateral level, the successful conclusion of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) in the World Trade Organization elevates the protection and enforcement of IPRs to the level of solemn international commitment.

The new global IPR system comes with both benefits and costs. Stronger IPRs protection should increase incentives for innovation and raise returns to international technology transfer. However, it also could raise the costs of acquiring new technology and products, shifting the global terms of trade in favor of technology producers and against technology consumers. In this context, the new regime raises international economic policy questions that evoke impassioned and exaggerated claims from both advocates and opponents of IPRs, particularly concerning sensitive issues such as patent protection of pharmaceuticals and biotechnological inventions, and copyright protection for internet transactions.

In the first comprehensive economic assessment of the effects of stronger international IPRs, Keith E. Maskus examines these competing claims through an analysis of the economic effects of extended international protection and partial harmonization of IPRs. He presents findings on the potential effects of stronger global IPRs, including likely impacts on foreign direct investment, technology transfer, and pricing under enhanced market power. The results bear directly on several important policy questions, including the construction of complementary initiatives on market liberalization and competition rules, and Maskus discusses whether priority attention should be devoted to them in the upcoming next round of global trade talks.

The failure of the Seattle trade ministerial in December 1999 to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations dealt a major blow to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Seattle meetings exposed significant policy differences among the WTO member countries as well as shortcomings in the way the WTO conducts its business and interacts with other international and nongovernmental organizations. The WTO after Seattle analyzes the problems and challenges facing the trading system in the aftermath of the Seattle ministerial. Leading trade experts examine why it is in the interests of both developed and developing countries to reengage in new trade talks, and how such talks could promote world trade and economic development, reform WTO operations, and strengthen public support for the trading system.

The volume presents balanced perspectives on world trade problems by authors from the United States, Europe, Asia, and Latin America, with recommendations on what needs to be done in key areas to launch new talks. The authors address the WTO's existing mandate to negotiate on agriculture and services, as well as how to handle new issues such as investment, competition policy, e-commerce, and trade-related environmental and labor issues. The editor, Jeffrey J. Schott, provides a comprehensive overview of the issues facing the WTO and of what needs to be done to begin a new round.

This report contains the findings and recommendations of an independent blue-ribbon commission on the future international financial architecture. The commission was sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, and co-chaired by Peter G. Peterson and Carla A. Hills, with the Institute for International Economics' Morris Goldstein serving as project director. The membership is listed below. The report analyzes the main factors that give rise to banking, currency, and debt crises, and it proposes a set of interrelated recommendations for improving crisis prevention and resolution. It also explains why the United States, despite its impressive overall economic performance since the outbreak of the Asian crisis, has a large stake in the future international financial architecture. The commission's recommendations aim at altering the behavior of emerging-market borrowers and their private creditors in ways that would reduce vulnerabilities in the exchange rate systems of emerging economies; inducing private creditors to accept their fair share of the costs of crisis resolution; reforming the IMF's lending policies; and refocusing the mandates of the IMF and the World Bank on leaner agendas. Its recommendations range well beyond the decisions taken to date by the international financial community.

A series of dissenting opinions by individual members is included. Other members of the commission were Paul Allaire, C. Fred Bergsten, Kenneth Dam, George David, Jorge Dominguez, Kenneth Duberstein, Barry Eichengreen, Martin Feldstein, Maurice Greenberg, Lee Hamilton, John Heimann, Peter Kenen, Paul Krugman, Nicholas Lardy, David Lipton, Ray Marshall, Norman Ornstein, William Rhodes, Stephen Roach, Henry Schacht, James Schlesinger, George Soros, Laura Tyson, Ezra Vogel, Paul Volcker, and Vin Weber.

Countries that entered the European Monetary Union had to do so at exchange rates that are close to equilibrium levels. So when are exchange rates at equilibrium levels? Real Exchange Rates for the Year 2000 discusses the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) method and estimates FEERS for the G7 countries for 1995 and 2000. There have been large swings in all G7 currencies in the last five years, and in these circumstances, the markets and policymakers need better guides to the sustainable levels of these currencies.

The authors estimate equilibrium real exchange rates using a partial-equilibrium model based on econometric trade equations, assumptions of trend output, and estimates of the medium-run current account. They emphasize that the FEER is a medium-run construct and contrast it with the purchasing price parity (PPP) method of determining rates. The authors discuss the links between the FEER and fiscal policy and the extent to which the FEER is a normative concept. They conclude with sensitivity analysis for changes in current account and trend GDP assumptions.

The Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) holds more than $40 billion that is at the disposal of the US Secretary of the Treasury for use in foreign exchange intervention and international financial support operations. Its use in the Mexican rescue package of 1995 brought the ESF into the public spotlight for the first time in recent years, and it has been deployed in Brazil and several Asian crisis countries as well. Its availability for such packages and its total control by the Treasury secretary have therefore become very controversial.

Randall Henning's study maintains that the Fund is an important element of US foreign policy and economic policy and that it should remain under the exclusive control of the Treasury, but that Congress should exercise effective oversight. Henning also covers the legislative history of the ESF and outlines the principles by which the Fund should be administered.

The Asian financial crisis has precipitated significant changes in real exchange rates in the region that will substantially alter the volume and pattern of international trade. The crisis countries will increase their exports and, especially, reduce their imports. Japan, China, and the other non-crisis countries will experience more complex changes. The trade balances of the United States and Western Europe will deteriorate by about $40-50 billion as a result of the currency movements in Asia.

This study, newly updated in August 1999, quantifies the impact of the currency changes on the individual countries in Asia, on the United States, on Europe and on other regions on a sector-by-sector basis. It analyzes the additional impact that might occur if China, thus far a relative bystander in the crisis, were to devalue its currency as well. It then examines potential trade policy responses to these developments including the risk of an upsurge in protectionist pressure in the United States.

This study presents the case for an international banking standard (IBS) to deal with the rash of banking crises in developing countries. Over the past 15 years, almost three-fourths of the IMF's member countries have experienced at least one serious bout of banking problems; there have been at least a dozen developing country episodes where the costs of these crises amounted to 10 percent or more of the country's GDP; and the total public sector resolution costs of developing-country banking crises have been estimated to be $250 billion. Not only are these banking crises extremely costly to developing countries, they also pose increased risk to industrial countries.

Morris Goldstein demonstrates that existing international agreements do not address the main sources of these crises, and the adoption of a voluntary IBS offers a more attractive route to banking reform than the relevant alternatives. The study recommends minimum standards in eight key areas of banking supervision and addresses the operational issues associated with the design and implementation of an IBS.

The recently-adopted OECD convention outlawing bribery of foreign public officials is welcome evidence of how much progress has been made in the battle against corruption. The financial crisis in East Asia is an indication of how much remains to be done. Corruption is by no means a new issue but it has only recently emerged as a global issue. With the end of the Cold War, the pace and breadth of the trends toward democratization and international economic integration accelerated and expanded globally. Yet corruption could slow or even reverse these trends, potentially threatening economic development and political stability in some countries.

As the global implications of corruption have grown, so has the impetus for international action to combat it. In addition to efforts in the OECD, the Organization of American States, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations General Assembly, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have both begun to emphasize corruption as an impediment to economic development.

This book includes a chapter by the Chairman of the OECD Working Group on Bribery discussing the evolution of the OECD convention and what is needed to make it effective. Other chapters address the causes and consequences of corruption, including the impact on investment and growth and the role of multinational corporations in discouraging bribery. The final chapter summarizes and also discusses some of the other anticorruption initiatives that either have been or should be adopted by governments, multilateral development banks, and other international organizations.