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This volume describes an extensive range of methods which can be used to identify design errors, including deep failure mode and effects analysis, hazard and operability analysis, action error analysis and zonal analysis. The sneak analysis method is described in depth.
Many analysis methods for error identification are quite costly to implement in terms of engineer time and project time. Automation of hazard identification is described, including examples of practical application.
A special feature of this volume is the description of methods for automated checking of specification texts for completeness, consistency and compliance with legal and standards requirements.
The volume reviews the published methods for risk analysis of the design process, which aim to predict the frequency or number of errors in designs. Current approaches to project risk assessment are also described . The volume concludes with a summary of the current status of design error avoidance and prevention, and the impact of the explicit study of design error and avoidance on the future of engineering.
Robert Taylor is an engineer with 55 years of experience in research, practical design and of international consulting in the field of risk analysis. Starting at the Theoretical Physics Department at the UKAEA Harwell research laboratory, he moved to the Risø National Laboratory in Denmark where he worked in development and validation of risk analysis procedures for major hazards plants, prevention of design error in nuclear power and in aerospace systems, in software safety analysis and working together with Pr. Jens Rasmussen, on the development of validated methods for human error analysis.
Together with his wife Hanne, in 1987 he formed a company to undertake international consulting, with projects on every continent except Antarctica.
Major achievements were development of automated methods for hazard and operability analysis and software fault tree analysis, development of an extended evidence based human error probability database, performance of follow up studies of the accuracy of risk assessments compared with actual experience for over 100 plants, and development of a series of methods for identification of design error, one of which became an international standard.