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Volume 9 is entitled "Industrial Organization" and is the ninth volume in the series "Advances in Applied Microeconomics". This series provides a forum in which researchers may disseminate frontier research in applied microeconomics to include both theoretical and empirical contributions in applied areas such as industrial organization, consumer and producer behavior, public economics, natural resources, and other applied microeconomic fields. Volumes are published along themes and contain theoretical papers that apply state-of-the-art theory to model important real-world phenomenon, as well as empirical papers that examine such phenomenon.
Price: $223.99
Pages: 316
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Imprint: JAI Press Inc.
Series: Advances in Applied Microeconomics
Publication Date:
20 December 2000
ISBN: 9780762306879
Format: Hardcover
BISACs:
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Microeconomics, Microeconomics
List of contributors. Editor's note. Output price and markup dispersion in micro data: the roles of producer heterogeneity and noise (M.J. Roberts, D. Supina). Quotas and tariffs with endogenous conduct (R.J. Deneckere, K. Kovenock and Y.Y. Sohn). Strategic advertising and pricing in e-commerce (D.O. Stahl, II). Strategic vertical contracting with endogenous number of downstream divisions (K. Saggi, N. Vettas). Why people buy liability insurance under the rule of simple negligence (K.J. Crocker, N. Doherty). Price discrimination based on consumer purchase history (M. Arbatskaya). Transaction-cost economics and the organization of agricultural transactions (S.E. Masten). A strategic search model of technology adoption and policy (H.C. Hoppe). Applying the rule of reason to maximum resale price fixing: Albrecht overruled (R.D. Blair, J.M. Fesmire and R. Romano). Rigid monopoly prices (M. Stegeman). Minimum quality standards in a horizontally differentiated market (J.W. Maxwell). Strategic delegation in cournot oligopoly with incomplete information (G. Merzoni).