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This book provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Reevaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins view parties in the House—especially majority parties—as a species of "legislative cartel." These cartels usurp the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Possession of this rule-making power leads to two main consequences. First, the legislative process in general, and the committee system in particular, is stacked in favor of majority party interests. Second, because the majority party has all the structural advantages, the key players in most legislative deals are members of that party and the majority party's central agreements are facilitated by cartel rules and policed by the cartel's leadership.
Debunking prevailing arguments about the weakening of congressional parties, Cox and McCubbins powerfully illuminate the ways in which parties exercise considerable discretion in organizing the House to carry out its work.
This work will have an important impact on the study of American politics, and will greatly interest students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.
Debunking prevailing arguments about the weakening of congressional parties, Cox and McCubbins powerfully illuminate the ways in which parties exercise considerable discretion in organizing the House to carry out its work.
This work will have an important impact on the study of American politics, and will greatly interest students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.
Price: $31.95
Pages: 289
Publisher: University of California Press
Imprint: University of California Press
Series: California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy
Publication Date:
05 April 1993
ISBN: 9780520910768
Format: eBook
List of Figures
List of Tables
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. The Weakness of Parties
2. Committee Government
3. Outline of the Book
PART ONE THE AUTONOMY AND
DISTINCTIVENESS OF COMMITTEES
1. Self-Selection and the Subgovernment Thesis
1. Self-Selection
2. Constituency Interests and
Assignment Requests
3. Accommodation of Assignment Requests
4. Accommodation of Transfer Requests
5. The Routinization of the Assignment Process
6. Norms in the Assignment Process
7. Conclusion
2. The Seniority System in Congress
1. Seniority in the Rayburn House:
The Standard View
2. Reconsidering the Standard View
3. The Empirical Evidence
4. Interpreting the Evidence
5. Conclusion
3. Subgovernments and the Representativeness
of Committees
1. The Previous Literature
2. Data and Methodology
3. Results
4. Conclusion
PART TWO A THEORY OF PARTY
ORGANIZATION
4. Institutions as Solutions to Collective
Dilemmas
1. Collective Dilemmas
2. Central Authority: The Basics
3. Why Central Authority Is
Sometimes Necessary
4. Multiperiod Considerations
5. Problems with Central Authority
6. Conclusion
5. A Theory of Legislative Parties
1. The Reelection Goal
2. Reelection Maximizers and
Electoral Inefficiencies
3. Party Leadership
4. Conclusion
PART THREE PARTIES AS FLOOR VOTING
COALITIONS
6. On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress
1. Party Voting: Trends in the 1980s
2. Party Voting: Trends from 1910 to
the 1970s
3. Party Agendas and Party Leadership Votes
4. Conclusion
PART FOUR PARTIES AS PROCEDURAL
COALITIONS: COMMITTEE
APPOINTMENTS
7. Party Loyalty and Committee Assignments
1. Assignments to Control Committees
2. Party Loyalty and Transfers to
House Committees
3. Assignment Success of Freshmen
4. Conclusion
8. Contingents and Parties
1. A Model of Partisan Selection
2. Which Committees' Contingents
Will Be Representative?
3. Results
4. Conclusion
PART FIVE PARTIES AS PROCEDURAL
COALITIONS: THE SCHEDULING POWER
9. The Majority Party and the
Legislative Agenda
1. The Speaker's Collective Scheduling Problem
2. Limits on the Scheduling Power
3. Committee Agendas and the Speaker
4. Intercommittee Logrolls
5. Conclusion
10. Controlling the Legislative Agenda
1. The Majority Party and the
Committee System
2. The Consequences of Structural Power:
The Legislative Agenda
3. The Consequences of Structural Power:
Public Policy
4. Comments on the Postwar House
Conclusion
Appendixes
1. Uncompensated Seniority Violations,
Eightieth through Hundredth Congresses
2. A Model of the Speaker's Scheduling
Preferences
3. Unchallengeable and Challengeable Vetoes
4. The Scheduling Power
References
Author Index
Subject Index
List of Tables
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. The Weakness of Parties
2. Committee Government
3. Outline of the Book
PART ONE THE AUTONOMY AND
DISTINCTIVENESS OF COMMITTEES
1. Self-Selection and the Subgovernment Thesis
1. Self-Selection
2. Constituency Interests and
Assignment Requests
3. Accommodation of Assignment Requests
4. Accommodation of Transfer Requests
5. The Routinization of the Assignment Process
6. Norms in the Assignment Process
7. Conclusion
2. The Seniority System in Congress
1. Seniority in the Rayburn House:
The Standard View
2. Reconsidering the Standard View
3. The Empirical Evidence
4. Interpreting the Evidence
5. Conclusion
3. Subgovernments and the Representativeness
of Committees
1. The Previous Literature
2. Data and Methodology
3. Results
4. Conclusion
PART TWO A THEORY OF PARTY
ORGANIZATION
4. Institutions as Solutions to Collective
Dilemmas
1. Collective Dilemmas
2. Central Authority: The Basics
3. Why Central Authority Is
Sometimes Necessary
4. Multiperiod Considerations
5. Problems with Central Authority
6. Conclusion
5. A Theory of Legislative Parties
1. The Reelection Goal
2. Reelection Maximizers and
Electoral Inefficiencies
3. Party Leadership
4. Conclusion
PART THREE PARTIES AS FLOOR VOTING
COALITIONS
6. On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress
1. Party Voting: Trends in the 1980s
2. Party Voting: Trends from 1910 to
the 1970s
3. Party Agendas and Party Leadership Votes
4. Conclusion
PART FOUR PARTIES AS PROCEDURAL
COALITIONS: COMMITTEE
APPOINTMENTS
7. Party Loyalty and Committee Assignments
1. Assignments to Control Committees
2. Party Loyalty and Transfers to
House Committees
3. Assignment Success of Freshmen
4. Conclusion
8. Contingents and Parties
1. A Model of Partisan Selection
2. Which Committees' Contingents
Will Be Representative?
3. Results
4. Conclusion
PART FIVE PARTIES AS PROCEDURAL
COALITIONS: THE SCHEDULING POWER
9. The Majority Party and the
Legislative Agenda
1. The Speaker's Collective Scheduling Problem
2. Limits on the Scheduling Power
3. Committee Agendas and the Speaker
4. Intercommittee Logrolls
5. Conclusion
10. Controlling the Legislative Agenda
1. The Majority Party and the
Committee System
2. The Consequences of Structural Power:
The Legislative Agenda
3. The Consequences of Structural Power:
Public Policy
4. Comments on the Postwar House
Conclusion
Appendixes
1. Uncompensated Seniority Violations,
Eightieth through Hundredth Congresses
2. A Model of the Speaker's Scheduling
Preferences
3. Unchallengeable and Challengeable Vetoes
4. The Scheduling Power
References
Author Index
Subject Index