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A detailed analysis of the limitations of the system which relied on intermediaries and private suppliers to finance, build and maintain the French navy.
Although Louis XIV's navy did not "win" in any recognisable sense during the wars of the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, it was nevertheless one of the largest military institutions of the entire early modern world at a key moment in the evolution of the modern state and modern warfare. This book examines how Louis XIV's navy was financed, arguing that the way the state spends money, and the relative efficiency and accountability of that spending, is fundamental to understanding the effectiveness of a military system. It outlines how the French crown depended on fiscal intermediaries and private suppliers, explores how its failure to control the spending and activities of its contractors fundamentally limited France's strategic possibilities at sea, and discusses how these structural problems were progressively and disastrously exposed as the state's financial situation deteriorated. The book sets the activities of the French navy in the wider context of the wars of the period, showing that France necessarily had to give precedence to the funding of its army. Overall, the book highlights the limitations of the contractor state, demonstrating that early modern navies were both too complex and investment-heavy to be entirely outsourced.
Although Louis XIV's navy did not "win" in any recognisable sense during the wars of the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, it was nevertheless one of the largest military institutions of the entire early modern world at a key moment in the evolution of the modern state and modern warfare. This book examines how Louis XIV's navy was financed, arguing that the way the state spends money, and the relative efficiency and accountability of that spending, is fundamental to understanding the effectiveness of a military system. It outlines how the French crown depended on fiscal intermediaries and private suppliers, explores how its failure to control the spending and activities of its contractors fundamentally limited France's strategic possibilities at sea, and discusses how these structural problems were progressively and disastrously exposed as the state's financial situation deteriorated. The book sets the activities of the French navy in the wider context of the wars of the period, showing that France necessarily had to give precedence to the funding of its army. Overall, the book highlights the limitations of the contractor state, demonstrating that early modern navies were both too complex and investment-heavy to be entirely outsourced.
Price: $130.00
Pages: 294
Publisher: Boydell & Brewer Inc.
Imprint: Boydell Press
Publication Date:
19 December 2023
Trim Size: 9.21 X 6.14 in
ISBN: 9781837650545
Format: Hardcover
BISACs:
HISTORY / Military / Naval, Naval forces and warfare, HISTORY / Modern / 17th Century, HISTORY / Europe / France, Military history
It makes an important contribution to the discussion on the interdependence of financial management, information flow, and operational capacity in early modern warfare. It provides important impulses for the military, administrative, and financial history of the Ancien Régime and impressively demonstrates how closely military power was linked to infrastructures of credit, administration, and information processing.
Er einen wichtigen Beitrag zurDiskussion um die Interdependenz von Finanzmanagement, Informationsfluss und operativer Handlungsfähigkeit in derfrühneuzeitlichen Kriegsführung. Sie liefert wichtige Impulse für die Militär-, Verwaltungs- undFinanzgeschichte des Ancien Régime und zeigt eindrucksvoll, wieeng militärische Schlagkraft mit Infrastrukturen des Kreditwesens,der Verwaltung und der Informationsverarbeitung verknüpft war.
Er einen wichtigen Beitrag zurDiskussion um die Interdependenz von Finanzmanagement, Informationsfluss und operativer Handlungsfähigkeit in derfrühneuzeitlichen Kriegsführung. Sie liefert wichtige Impulse für die Militär-, Verwaltungs- undFinanzgeschichte des Ancien Régime und zeigt eindrucksvoll, wieeng militärische Schlagkraft mit Infrastrukturen des Kreditwesens,der Verwaltung und der Informationsverarbeitung verknüpft war.
Benjamin Darnell completed his doctorate at the University of Oxford.
General Introduction
PART I: THE STRATEGIC AND FISCAL CONTEXT
Introduction
1. French Naval Policy in the Nine Years' War
2. The Spanish Succession and the Shift in French Naval Strategy
3. Revenue-Raising and Credit Operations under Louis XIV
PART II: THE FINANCING OF NAVAL EXPENDITURE
Introduction
4. The Navy's Fiscal Intermediaries
5. The Costs, Risks, and Rewards of Office
PART III: PAYMASTER ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STATE
Introduction
6. Accounting Regulations and Financial Reporting Structures in the Navy
7. Financial Intelligence Gathering in War
8. Private Interest, Misappropriation, and Fraud in the Naval Treasury
PART IV: THE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE NAVAL TREASURY
Introduction
9. Organisational Expedients and Securing Access to Credit, 1628-1688
10. Reforms and the Fiscal Challenges of War, 1688-1701
PART V: FISCAL OVEREXTENSION AND OPERATIONAL PARALYSIS IN THE ERA OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION
Introduction
11. Funding Shortfalls and Financial Pressures, 1701-1707
12. The Collapse of French Naval Power, 1707-1709
Conclusion
Appendices
Bibliography
Index
PART I: THE STRATEGIC AND FISCAL CONTEXT
Introduction
1. French Naval Policy in the Nine Years' War
2. The Spanish Succession and the Shift in French Naval Strategy
3. Revenue-Raising and Credit Operations under Louis XIV
PART II: THE FINANCING OF NAVAL EXPENDITURE
Introduction
4. The Navy's Fiscal Intermediaries
5. The Costs, Risks, and Rewards of Office
PART III: PAYMASTER ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STATE
Introduction
6. Accounting Regulations and Financial Reporting Structures in the Navy
7. Financial Intelligence Gathering in War
8. Private Interest, Misappropriation, and Fraud in the Naval Treasury
PART IV: THE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE NAVAL TREASURY
Introduction
9. Organisational Expedients and Securing Access to Credit, 1628-1688
10. Reforms and the Fiscal Challenges of War, 1688-1701
PART V: FISCAL OVEREXTENSION AND OPERATIONAL PARALYSIS IN THE ERA OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION
Introduction
11. Funding Shortfalls and Financial Pressures, 1701-1707
12. The Collapse of French Naval Power, 1707-1709
Conclusion
Appendices
Bibliography
Index