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Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security

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In this book, the leading authority on India's nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. Basrur shows that the country's nuclear culture is generall...
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  • 23 November 2005
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In this book, a leading authority on India’s nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India’s nuclear strategy. He shows that the country’s nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. He addresses areas of concern, notably the relationship between minimum deterrence and subnuclear conflict, the threat from nuclear terrorism, and the special challenges nuclear weapons pose for a democratic society.

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Price: $35.00
Pages: 264
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Imprint: Stanford University Press
Series: Studies in Asian Security
Publication Date: 23 November 2005
Trim Size: 9.00 X 6.00 in
ISBN: 9780804752565
Format: Paperback
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Rajesh M. Basrur is Director of the Centre for Global Studies in Mumbai, India. He has been a visiting fellow at Sandia National Laboratories, the Brookings Institution, and the Henry L. Stimson Center.