Nothing always remains the same prima facie; it is the absence of certainty, which applies both when nothing is complete emptiness and when it is thought of as privation. But how can such a constant negative produce many different results in the history of philosophy? It is obvious that a being can be interpreted in different ways because it possesses qualities or properties that allow for different determinations, but in the case of nothingness, there are no specifiable properties or possibilities of individuation. Therefore, nothingness presents itself as a unique problem. The different determinations of nothingness are only possible if there is a unified determination of nothingness that underlies the various approaches. The main perspectives of this volume are, on the one hand, to sift through the main definitions of different philosophical traditions and, on the other hand, to unite different determinations of nothingness into a coherent unified concept of nothingness. In other words, it presents an independent concept of nothingness.