Some error occured while loading the Quick View. Please close the Quick View and try reloading the page.
While policy makers and scholars have long devoted considerable attention to strategies like deterrence, which threaten others with unacceptable consequences, such threat-based strategies are not always the best option. In some cases, a state may be better off seeking to give others a greater sense of security, rather than by holding their security at risk. The most prominent use of these security assurances has been in conjunction with efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
Ongoing concerns about the nuclear activities of countries like Iran and North Korea, and the possible reactions of other states in their regions, have catapulted this topic into high profile. This book represents the first study to explore the overall utility of assurance strategies, to evaluate their effectiveness as a tool for preventing nuclear proliferation, and to identify conditions under which they are more or less likely to be effective.
— T. V. Paul, James McGill Professor of International Relations
"Welcome edited volume on nuclear nonproliferation . . . the contributors deserve substantial credit for developing a useful concept, exploring its implications, pulling the concept into explanatory propositions drawn from various theories, and testing the hypotheses on a set of relevant cases."
— James Lebovic
"This sophisticated and detailed study of security assurances provides new insights into the dynamics of nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation. It is an important contribution to both International Relations theory and policy-relevant research on nuclear deterrence."
— Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science
"Knopf has assembled a respected field of scholars as contributors, producing a well-edited work that maintains a consistent, disciplined focus across chapters . . . Recommended."
— C. W. Sherrill