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Social Foundations of Limited Dictatorship

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Using the Mexico of the late nineteenth and very early twentieth century as a test case, this book provides both a theory and methodology for the study of policy credibility in dictatorships.
  • 20 February 2008
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This innovative new book contributes simultaneously to two different disciplinary fields: comparative political economy and Mexican history. It does so by attempting to explain why Mexico—contrary to the predictions of several dominant theories of economic growth—enjoyed a comparatively high rate of economic growth and development under the highly authoritarian dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz (1876–1911). In conducting a detailed political analysis of Diaz's rule, Armando Razo introduces network analysis to the study of institutions and growth, and shows how dictators can maintain their power with credible growth-enhancing policies.

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Price: $85.00
Pages: 264
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Imprint: Stanford University Press
Series: Social Science History
Publication Date: 20 February 2008
Trim Size: 9.00 X 6.00 in
ISBN: 9780804756617
Format: Hardcover
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"Armando Razo's book is an exciting contribution to the expanding literature on the interconnections of politics, institutions, and economic growth . . . This book is required reading for anyone interested in the political economy of development, in the nature of doing business in developing countries, and in Latin American political and economic history. Its theoretical contributions are powerful, provocative, and compelling, and its empirical advances are substantial. By extending the kind of carefully systematic, rigorous work that Razo has done here on Porfirian Mexico to other countries, scholars will gain a better understanding, in comparative contexts, of the nature of investment and growth and the obstacles to achieving them."
Armando Razo is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. He is the co-author, with Steve Haber and Noel Maurer, of The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929 (2003).