The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend examines how the U.S. Army and the CIA partnered with former Wehrmacht Major General Reinhard Gehlen and how that relationship shaped American intelligence estimates of the Red Army in the early Cold War. At the end of World War II, Gehlen—Hitler’s leading expert on the Soviet Union—avoided prosecution at Nuremberg by offering the Americans his intelligence files, expertise, and spy network. By 1952, the CIA believed that nearly 80 percent of its reporting on the Red Army came from Gehlen’s organization.

However, the CIA did not realize that the Soviets had infiltrated Gehlen’s network by coercing or bribing many of his former Nazi operatives. As a result, U.S. analysts unknowingly relied on Soviet‑manipulated intelligence when assessing the Soviet threat. This distorted reporting inflated perceptions of Soviet military power and influenced key U.S. policy decisions, including support for West German rearmament, the creation of NATO, claims of military “gaps,” and President Eisenhower’s emphasis on nuclear deterrence. By tracing tactical reports through each stage of the intelligence process, this study challenges the idea that the Red Army posed an overwhelming threat during the early Cold War.