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The Logic of Force
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22 September 1994

Recent events in Somalia and Bosnia demonstrate that U.S. military intervention remains a contentious aspect of our foreign policy, usually broad sweep of this book, its excellent case studies, and its unique theory analyzing America’s use of force since World War II make it a solid introduction as well as a challenging appraisal for the student, general reader, or specialist.
The Logic of Force examines the postwar tension between two powerful analytical approaches to the use of force. The first approach argues that force is to be used ruthlessly and employed at whatever level necessary to decisively achieve a nation’s political and military objectives. The second, or limited war approach, posits that political objectives often require that limits be placed on the use of force, a perspective acceptable state of affairs to its adherents.
The cases presented here demonstrate that proponents of the two positions have disagreed over the proper manner in which to use force. These disagreements, often within the same administration, have influenced decisions concerning intervention and how to use military power. The following studies are included: Korea, the fall of French Indochina, Laos, Vietnam, Grenada, the Panama invasion, the Gulf War, Somalia, and Bosnia.
The Logic of Force the Dilemma of Policy
Patterns in Americas Use of Force Before the Korean War
The Struggle to Wage Limited War
The Dienbienphu Crisis
The Ascendance of Limited War Theory
Laos and the Never Again School
The Debates Over
The Lessons of Vietnam for the Use of Force
Reagan and Bush
Conclusions
CLINTONS FIRST YEAR
NOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX