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The no-fly zone is a frequently used instrument in the US foreign policy arsenal, despite detrimental, or even catastrophic, results. This book examines why the instrument has such a hold on leaders’ imaginations and rhetoric despite its patchy record in practice.
Examining detailed historical case studies from conflicts in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, South Sudan/Darfur, Libya and Syria, the book shows how debates about, and actual use of, no-fly zones in US foreign policy have not been primarily about managing conflict or protecting civilians. Instead, the focus is often on navigating contradictory international and domestic political incentives and constraints, leading to US intervention in an ill-considered and incremental manner.
‘In this clear-eyed analysis of US interventionism since the end of the Cold War, Gustav Meibauer argues that short-term political interests have repeatedly led US policymakers astray. Time and again, they have resorted to expediency over effectiveness. Scholars and students will find much to ponder in this sobering account of US foreign policymaking.’ Peter Trubowitz, London School of Economics and Political Science
‘Meibauer advances a bold neoclassical realist framework to understand the allure of no-fly zones in US military interventions. In its historical sweep of the 1990s and 2000s, this important inquiry highlights why American leaders are attracted to no-fly zones despite repeated failures.’ Steven E. Lobell, University of Utah
Introduction
1. A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Muddled Intervention
2. Bush Sr and the Iraqi No-Fly Zones
3. Clinton and the Bosnian No-Fly Zone
4. Clinton, Bush Jr and Potential No-Fly Zones in Kosovo and Sudan
5. Obama and the Libyan No-Fly Zone
6. A No-Fly Zone for Syria?
7. No-Fly Zones in US Foreign Policy Past, Present and Future